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This equation is generally called the price-setting (PS) schedule. It shows the
relation between the …rms’ desired level of employment and the real wage at
the …rms’ symmetric optimum. To close our macro model we notice that under
symmetry,
Y = neY = neL®: (10’)
By using (5), aggregate demand is
Y d = C +G = ¯
µ
Y ¡ T + M
P
¶
+G; (16)
where T denotes real taxes. Equations (7-7bis), (10’), (15) and (16) determine
the equilibrium levels of L, Y , W=P , P , given the exogenous policy variables
M , G and T . Notice that, were the relative price elasticity of public and private
demand equal, ° = ½, then the system would exhibit the standard dichotomy
property associated with full wage and price ‡exibility: equations (7), (10’) and
(15) would determine L, Y , and W=P , independently of the demand variables
M , G and T .7 The essence of the elasticity transmission mechanism, however,
is that if ° 6= ½, then the real policy variable G actually enters the price-setting
rule; it may therefore a¤ect output and employment by changing the …rms’
desired mark-up.
3 The elasticity transmissionmechanism and the
properties of technology
It is clear from the above that the key equation of the model is the price-
setting schedule (15). Provided an equilibrium exists at L < L, an increase in
employment might occur, if an increase in public expenditure induces the …rms
to employ a greater amount of labour at the reservation wage º. Figure 1 shows
that this requires an upward shift of the PS schedule through a reduction in the
desired price-over-cost margin when the PS schedule is downward sloping, and
a downward shift of the curve via an increase in the desired mark-up when the
PS is upward sloping.
This suggests that preliminary to any study of the pro- or counter-cyclical
impact of public expenditure on the desired mark-up, is the analysis of the slope
of the PS schedule.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
3.1 The slope of the PS schedule
First, we notice that equation (14) con be written as:
²
³ eG; eL´ = ½+ (° ¡ ½) eGeL® ;
7We recall that the structure of the household’s preferences is such that any e¤ect on the
labour supply is ruled out.
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where we stress the dependence of ² on eG and eL, generated by the di¤erence
in the elasticities of public and private demands. We denote now with r
³ eG; eL´
the …rm’s real marginal revenue under symmetry or, in other terms, the inverse
of the equilibrium mark-up of price over marginal costs:8
r
³ eG; eL´ =
0@1¡ 1
²
³ eG; eL´
1A :
This allows us to reformulate conveniently the PS schedule as:
! =
W
P
= ®eL®¡1r ³ eG; eL´ ; (17)
and the elasticity of ! with respect to eL is
d!
deL eL! = (®¡ 1) + ´reL
³ eG; eL´ ;
where ´reL
³ eG; eL´ = ³¡® (° ¡ ½) eG=eL®´ =² (²¡ 1) is the elasticity of the real
marginal revenue with respect to labour.
Notice that the elasticity of the price-setting schedule is the sum of the
elasticity of the marginal productivity of labour function and the elasticity of
the real marginal revenue with respect to labour. Should r be constant (which
is the case when ° = ½), the latter would be zero, and the elasticity of the PS
curve would depend on the returns to scale only. But in this set-up r is not a
constant; rather, it depends on eG and eL, the sign of these relations depending
on the sign of (° ¡ ½). Therefore the quantitative and qualitative behaviour of
the elasticity of the PS schedule for di¤erent values of eL depends not only on
the returns to scale, but also on eG and the di¤erence between the elasticity of
public and private demand.
In particular, the PS schedule will be upward or downward sloping according
to the sign of (®¡ 1) + ´reL
³ eG; eL´. As for the latter, (®¡ 1) is obviously neg-
ative under decreasing returns to scale and positive under increasing returns;
´reL
³ eG; eL´ is negative if ° > ½, i.e. if the elasticity of public demand is greater
than the elasticity of private demand, and positive in the opposite case. There-
fore the PS is unambiguously downward sloping if ° > ½, and returns to scale
are non-increasing; it is unambiguously upward sloping if ° < ½, and returns to
scale are non-decreasing.
However, the interaction between the technological and elasticity e¤ect on
the shape of the PS may be such that, for given eG, we may observe a downward
sloping PS curve with (moderately) increasing returns, provided that public
demand is more elastic than private demand to such an extent that the mark-
up factor strongly decreases as eL decreases, thus increasing eG=eL®. Similarly, we
may observe an upward sloping PS curve with (moderately) decreasing returns,
provided that public demand is less elastic than private demand to such an
extent that the mark-up factor strongly increases as eL decreases, thus increasingeG=eL®
8Notice that (1¡ r) is the Lerner index of monopoly power.
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We may conclude that, if the mark-up is very sensitive to the composition
of demand, the sign of the …rms’ desired employment-real wage relation may
depend on the properties of the demand side of the model. Needless to say,
in the case of constant returns to scale, frequently referred to in the literature,
the shape of the PS curve is entirely determined by the behaviour of the real
marginal revenue.
3.2 The e¤ects of …scal policy
We now study the comparative statics of our macro-model, by concentrating
upon changes in public demand. We notice that the sub-system (7-7bis) and
(17) is su¢cient to evaluate the e¤ectiveness of G on employment. In particular,
we now want to derive explicitly an employment multiplier, which the properties
of the model make it more convenient to formulate in terms of elasticity.
Assume again that an equilibrium obtains at L¤ = nfL¤ < L .9 Clearly, at
this equilibrium,
F
³ eG; eL¤´ = ®³eL¤´®¡1 r ³ eG; eL¤´¡ º = 0;
implicit di¤erentiation of which gives:
dfL¤
d eG = ¡
@F
d eG
@F
@fL¤
= ¡
!eG´r eG
!fL¤ £(®¡ 1) + ´reL¤
; (18)
where ´r eG =
³
(° ¡ ½) eG=eL®´ =² (²¡ 1)
By using the de…nition of ´reL, we can reformulate (18) in terms of elasticity:
´eL eG = dfL¤
d eG eGfL¤ = ¡ ´r eG(®¡ 1)¡ ®´r eG = ´r eG(1¡ ®) + ®´r eG : (19)
Again, the sign of this expression depends on the interaction between the returns
to scale and the mark-up behaviour. Indeed, equilibrium employment will react
positively to an increase in eG, if the numerator and the denominator of (19)
are either both positive, or both negative. This allows to establish the following
propositions.
Proposition 1 If the elasticity of public demand is greater than the elasticity
of private demand, ° > ½; then a …scal expansion increases the equilibrium level
of employment i¤ ´r eG > (®¡ 1) =®:
Indeed, if ° > ½, the numerator of (19) is positive and a …scal expansion
shifts the PS schedule upwards in the (eL;!) plane. For employment to increase
following this shift, the PS schedule must be negatively sloped (the denominator
of (19) must be positive). This is always veri…ed for non-increasing returns,
but can also be consistent with increasing returns, provided that the marginal
revenue is su¢ciently sensitive to the composition of demand and returns are
not too increasing, ´r eG > (®¡ 1) =®.
9Were the PS schedule non-monotone, multiple underemployment equilibria could arise.
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Proposition 2 If the elasticity of public demand is lower than the elasticity of
private demand, ° < ½; then a …scal expansion increases the equilibrium level of
employment i¤ ´r eG < (®¡ 1) =®.
If ° < ½, the numerator of (19) is negative and a …scal expansion shifts
the PS schedule downwards in the (eL;!) plane. For employment to increase
following this shift, the PS schedule must be positively sloped (the denominator
of (19) must be negative). This is always veri…ed for non-decreasing returns,
but can also be consistent with decreasing returns, provided that the marginal
revenue is su¢ciently sensitive to the composition of demand and returns are
not too decreasing,
¯¯
´r eG¯¯ > j(®¡ 1) =®j.
This result allows extending the range of situations in which expansionary
…scal policy actually increases employment and output, as compared with those
previously established in the literature. According to the standard tenet (Sil-
vestre 1995, p.326), under decreasing returns an increase in public expenditure is
expansionary only if public demand is more elastic than private demand, hence
reduces the desired mark-up at the initial equilibrium. Similarly, under increas-
ing returns a …scal expansion should reduce the overall elasticity of demand
(public demand must be less elastic than private demand in our framework).
Our basic point is that a decrease in the desired mark-up at the initial equi-
librium is required when the PS is negatively sloped, but the latter situation
may not coincide with decreasing returns. Similarly, an increase in the desired
mark-up is not required under increasing returns, but when the PS schedule is
positively sloped.10
In particular, when the elasticity e¤ect works through the composition of
demand, a positive di¤erence in the elasticity of public and private demand,
which shrinks the mark-up at the initial equilibrium following a …scal expan-
sion, bends downward the slope of the PS curve, and may generate a downward
sloping PS curve even in the presence of increasing returns. The reverse is true
when public consumption is less elastic than private consumption: the impact
e¤ect is an increase of the mark-up, and this turns out to be expansionary
not only under increasing returns, but also under (moderately) decreasing ones,
through the same ’reversal of the slope’ phenomenon. Moreover, simple inspec-
tion of (19) shows that under constant returns …scal policy is unambiguously
expansionary, independently of its giving a pro- or counter-cyclical impulse to
demand elasticity.
We can therefore establish that there exists a range of values, around one,
of the technological parameter ® - the extension of which depends on the share
of public demand on aggregate demand - such that an increase in public expen-
diture is associated to an increase in employment and output, independently of
the direction of change of the elasticity of demand.
Finally, it may be interesting to evaluate the size of the elasticity multiplier
(19). Clearly, under constant returns, ´eL eG = 1: a percentage increase in public
consumption implies an identical percentage increase in employment and output.
As far as the other situations in which the multiplier is positive are concerned,
we may establish the following proposition.
10 In the Appendix we discuss the relevance of the ’reversal of the slope’ phenomenon by
identifying the ranges of technological and demand conditions which ensure that it actually
occurs.
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Proposition 3 If ´eL eG > 0, and ° > ½, then ´eL eG < 1 if ® < 1; ´eL eG > 1 if
® > 1. If ´eL eG > 0, and ° < ½, then ´eL eG < 1 if ® > 1; ´eL eG > 1 if ® < 1.
Proof. Assume ´eL eG > 0: The condition ´eL eG > 1 implies¯¯
´r eG¯¯ > ¯¯1¡ ®+ ®´r eG¯¯ : (20)
Consider …rst the case in which both ´r eG and 1¡ ®+ ®´r eG are positive, which
occurs when ° > ½: Notice that in this case ´r eG = 1²
(° ¡ ½) eGeL®
(° ¡ ½) eGeL® + (½¡ 1)
> 0
implies ´r eG < 1. Therefore, condition (20), which collapses to (1¡ ®) ´r eG >
(1¡ ®), is veri…ed only for ® > 1.
Consider now the case in which both ´r eG and 1 ¡ ® + ®´r eG are negative,
which occurs when ° < ½: Condition (20) collapses to (1¡ ®) ´r eG < (1¡ ®),
which for ´r eG negative is veri…ed only for ® < 1:
The above proposition establishes that whenever a positive multiplier results
from the ’slope reversal’ of the PS schedule described above, the multiplier turns
out to be greater than one. When a positive multiplier is obtained under the
usual conditions (public demand more elastic and decreasing returns, or public
demand less elastic under increasing returns), its value is lower than one.
The interesting implication of proposition 3 is that if the ’slope reversal’
mechanism operates, the increase in employment and output is more than pro-
portional to the increase in public expenditure. In this peculiar case, in the new
equilibrium position the share of public demand on aggregate demand decreases
- and though public demand is more (less) elastic than private demand, the
new equilibrium mark-up increases (decreases). For example, in the presence
of an increasing returns technology, the existence of a public component of de-
mand more elastic than the private component (a) may bend downwards the PS
schedule; (b) ensures that a …scal expansion shift this downward sloping sched-
ule outwards and generate a more than proportional increase in output: at the
initial equilibrium the demand elasticity increases, stimulating the expansion,
while at the …nal equilibrium the elasticity of demand actually decreases This
qualitative di¤erence between the direction of the change of the mark-up at the
initial and …nal equilibrium positions is speci…c to the ’reversal of the slope’ sit-
uations and does not show up in the other situations, in which the employment
and output multiplier is positive.
4 Extensions
In the above discussion some simplifying hypotheses have been introduced,
among which the most relevant are the absence of income e¤ects of taxation
on labour supply and the reversed-L shape of the labour supply schedule. As to
the former, we believe that it is a convenient one, when the focus is on a trans-
mission mechanism of …scal policy based on product market competitiveness. It
is conceptually easy to embody both the labour supply and the elasticity e¤ects
in more complicated models. As to the latter, it allowed us to concentrate the
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